Migration in an enlarged EU: A challenging solution? by Martin Kahanec & Klaus F. Zimmermann
 
Economic Papers are written by the Staff of the Directorate-General for Economic and Financial 
Affairs, or by experts working in association with them. The Papers are intended to increase awareness 
of the technical work being done by staff and to seek comments and suggestions for further analysis. 
The views expressed are the author’s alone and do not necessarily correspond to those of the European 
Commission. Comments and enquiries should be addressed to: 
 
European Commission 





























This paper exists in English only and can be downloaded from the website 
http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/publications  
 
A great deal of additional information is available on the Internet. It can be accessed through the 
















Klaus F. Zimmermann 
(IZA, DIW Berlin, Bonn University, and Free University of Berlin) 
 
Paper prepared for the Workshop: 
“Five years of an enlarged EU – a positive-sum game” 











The 2004 and 2007 enlargements of the European Union were unprecedented in a 
number of economic and policy aspects. This essay provides a broad and in-depth 
account of the effects of the post-enlargement migration flows on the receiving as 
well as sending countries in three broader areas: labour markets, welfare systems, and 
growth and competitiveness. Our analysis of the available literature and empirical 
evidence shows that (i) EU enlargement had a significant impact on migration flows 
from new to old member states, (ii) restrictions applied in some of the countries did 
not stop migrants from coming but changed the composition of the immigrants, (iii) 
any negative effects in the labour market on wages or employment are hard to detect, 
(iv) post-enlargement migration contributes to growth prospects of the EU, (v) these 
immigrants are strongly attached to the labour market, and (vi) they are quite unlikely 
to be among welfare recipients. These findings point out the difficulties that 
restrictions on the free movement of workers bring about. 
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  11. Introduction  
Europe as a crossroads of cultures and migration of people has been rather the rule 
than the exception. Since the 1960s immigration has been on rise especially in 
Western Europe (See Figure 1). In 2006, foreigners, whether non-citizens or foreign-
born, constitute substantial shares of population in most of the old member states of 
the European Union, but also in some of the new member states (See Table 1). Yet the 
enlargement of the European Union in May 2004 involving eight Central and Eastern 
European countries
1 (EU8) along with Malta and Cyprus, and the accession of 
Bulgaria and Romania (EU2) in January 2007 were unprecedented in how they 
changed the European migration landscape. The differences in income and 
employment opportunities between the old EU member states
2 and most new EU 
member states were large (see Figures 2 and 3); there was essentially no history of 
free migration between the Eastern and Western parts of Europe during the decades of 
separation by the “Iron Curtain”; and the new members from Central and Eastern 
Europe had undergone a transition from a centrally-planned economy to a market-
based one. These specific circumstances partly explain the sensitivity of the migration 
issue among policy makers and the general public across Europe, which traditionally 
stems from the apprehension of the potential economic, social, cultural and political 
consequences of migration. Concerns about labour markets and welfare systems have 
received particular attention.   
The free movement of workers constitutes a fundamental principle of the 
European Union, as stated in Article 39 of the Treaty establishing the European 
                                                 
1 Including the Czech Republic, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Hungary, Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia. 
EU10 includes also Cyprus and Malta. 
2 The old member states (EU15) in the context of these enlargements include Austria, Belgium, 
Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal, 
Spain, Sweden and the United Kingdom.  
  2Community.
3 Nevertheless, transitional periods of up to seven years were 
implemented, which restricted access of citizens from the new member states to the 
labour markets in the old member states. Only a few old member states opened their 
labour markets with no or mild transitional measures. Given this institutional variation 
and other important factors, such as geographic, linguistic or cultural distances, the 
recent EU enlargements have had heterogeneous effects on migration flows across 
Europe.   
The European Union faces a number of fundamental policy challenges, 
including an aging population, global competitiveness and growth, and the 
sustainability of social security systems. The diverse post-enlargement migration 
flows of a predominantly young labour force constitute an important policy issue that 
interacts with these challenges in both receiving and sending countries. Since a 
significant proportion of these migrants are women, their successful integration in the 
labour market is another important prerequisite for tackling these challenges 
adequately. Understanding the causes and effects of migration in an enlarged EU is a 
precondition for designing effective migration policies in Europe and thus a 
precondition for reaching the Lisbon targets as well as the key objectives of the 
European Employment Strategy and the Social Agenda. 
A focal objective of this essay is to advance and broaden our understanding of 
the effects of the post-enlargement migration flows and thus provide a well-founded 
insight into the functioning of an enlarged EU.
4 The paper will simultaneously 
address the opportunities and challenges brought about by the recent EU 
enlargements.  
                                                 
3 Article 39 entitles nationals of one EU member state to work in another EU member state under the 
same conditions as that member state’s own citizens. 
4 We cover the whole EU wherever possible and relevant, including Romania and Bulgaria as the most 
recent member states. While the five year period between 2004 and 2009 is the focus of the analysis, a 
broader time frame is called upon whenever necessary. 
  3Methodologically, we adopt a multilevel comparative analytical framework 
based on existing evidence, descriptive empirical analysis, as well as a number of in-
depth case studies. Specifically, we evaluate the existing evidence of the effects of 
migration flows in an enlarged EU on both source and destination countries. Three 
broader domains of the economic effects of migration are studied: labour markets; 
social security systems; and economic growth. We highlight the role of the 
determinants and temporal character of migration on its effects and study the benefits 
and costs of migration.  
 
2. The Contexts of the Recent EU Enlargements 
During its post World War II history, Western Europe witnessed substantial 
movements of people. Following the periods of post-War adjustment and 
decolonisation, growth-driven labour migration in the late 1950s and 1960s, post oil-
shock policy change and the resulting migration slowdown in the 1970s and 1980s, 
refugee and asylum seeker flows in the early 1990s, and the ensuing “Fortress 
Europe” policy reaction, EU enlargement opened gateways for new migration 
trajectories. Given the complexity of the issues related to migration, transitional 
arrangements were specified by the Accession Treaties of the 2004 and 2007 EU 
enlargements. These are based on the 2-3-2 formula: for the first two years following 
accession access to the labour markets of the incumbent member states depends on 
their national laws and policies. National measures may be extended for a further 
period of three years. However, should an EU member state find, after that period, 
that its labour market has been severely disrupted, it is possible to have these national 
measures extended for a further two years.  
  4Following the 2004 EU enlargement, Ireland, the UK and Sweden opened 
access to their labour markets immediately.
5 As for social benefits, access to the 
welfare systems in Ireland and the UK depends on the duration of residence and 
employment. This is in contrast to Sweden, which decided to apply European 
Community rules. In the second phase of these arrangements (European Commission, 
2006a), eight more member states opened their labour markets by November 2008 
(Spain, Finland, France, Greece, Portugal, Italy, the Netherlands and Luxembourg). 
Most of the EU15 member states that have maintained restrictions have simplified 
their existing national access regimes or procedures by varying degrees or liberalised 
the access rules in some sectors or professions (Belgium, Germany and Denmark). 
Germany and Austria have decided to maintain national measures for the second 
phase. As for the 2007 enlargement, ten EU25 member states (the Czech Republic, 
Estonia, Cyprus, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Slovenia, Slovakia, Finland and Sweden) 
liberalised the access of Bulgarian and Romanian workers to their labour markets 
during the first phase.
6  
 
3. The Scale of Post Enlargement Migration 
One of the main reasons for adopting the transitional arrangements was a fear of mass 
migration from the new member states. There is a relatively large body of literature 
that attempts to estimate potential migration after enlargement (see, for example, 
Bauer and Zimmermann, 1999; Boeri et al., 2001; Alvarez-Plata et al., 2003; and 
                                                 
5 In the UK immigrants from the EU8 have to register with the Home Office administered Worker 
Registration Scheme if they are employed in the UK for a month or more. This requirement allows the 
authorities to monitor immigration and its impact on the British labour market. In Ireland individual 
identification, Personal Public Service Numbers, is required in order to gain employment or access to 
state benefits and public services. 
6 In Finland, Cyprus and Slovenia employment must subsequently be registered for monitoring 
purposes. 
  5Zaiceva, 2006).
7 These studies generally predict that between 2 and 4 percent of the 
new member states' population will move to the EU15 countries in the long run, 
which constitutes about 1 percent of the EU15 population. Some studies, however, 
estimate the upper bound of potential migration to be 7-8 percent of the new member 
states' population (Sinn et al., 2000). All these studies are based on strong 
assumptions, project counterfactual scenarios for out-of-sample countries, and do not 
take into account differences in transitional arrangements. 
  A number of recent studies scrutinise migration intentions after the EU 
enlargement (Fouarge and Ester, 2007a, 2007b; Bonin et al. 2008; Zaiceva and 
Zimmermann, 2008; Blanchflower and Lawton, 2008). Remarkably, the proportion of 
individuals intending to emigrate after the 2004 enlargement was found to be larger in 
the new member states than in the old EU15, while it was smaller before the 
enlargement (see Fouarge and Ester, 2007a; Zaiceva and Zimmermann, 2008; and 
Drinkwater, 2003). This finding suggests that with open borders an increasing number 
of individuals in the EU8 consider the option to work abroad, since after EU 
accession the option to return or migrate again became always available. 
  A comprehensive account of the actual post-enlargement migration flows is 
currently very difficult to provide, mainly due to the general scarcity of migration 
data. Early evidence reported by the European Commission (2006a, 2006b) suggests 
that migration flows between the EU8 and EU15 member states have been quite 
modest on average. However, as a result of coordination failures and migration 
diversion
8, these immigrants are unequally distributed across different member states, 
with some countries experiencing a relatively large increase in the number of 
immigrants. According to these reports, the UK, Austria and Ireland have most 
                                                 
7 See Zaiceva and Zimmermann (2008) for an extensive review. 
8 See Boeri and Brücker (2005). 
  6probably experienced an increase in immigration as a consequence of EU 
enlargement. Nevertheless, in the first quarter of 2005 the proportion of the working 
age population from the ten new member states in the EU15 “was rather small, 
ranging from 0.1 percent in France and in the Netherlands to 1.4 percent in Austria 
and 2 percent in Ireland” (European Commission, 2006a, p. 9). The European 
Commission’s reports also suggest that there is no conclusive evidence of a direct link 
between the magnitude of migration flows and the transitional arrangements in place. 
The data also show that a significant fraction of permits is granted to short-term or 
seasonal workers, that employment rates among immigrants from the new member 
states are comparable to those of the EU15 nationals, and that they are generally 
higher than for non-EU nationals.  
There are several country studies that document actual migration after the 
enlargement in destination countries. Zaiceva and Zimmermann (2008) evaluate the 
scale, diversity, and determinants of labour migration in Europe, suggesting that there 
was an increase in immigration from the new member states into most EU15 
countries, albeit this increase varied quite substantially. While in most of EU15 
countries Poland was the main sending country, Estonians are dominant in Finland, 
and Romanians in Spain.  
Gilpin et al. (2006) report a substantial increase in the number of nationals 
from new member states in the UK following enlargement. According to the UK 
Home Office (2007), there was however a decline in the number of applicants to the 
Worker Registration Scheme (WRS) in the first quarter of 2007 compared to the last 
quarter of 2006. The most recent Accession Monitoring Report (Home Office, 2008) 
states that the number of applicants to the WRS, the majority of whom were from 
Poland, followed by Slovaks and Lithuanians, rose from 134,550 in May-December 
  72004 to 234,725 in 2006 and fell slightly to 217,740 in 2007. According to 
Blanchflower and Lawton (2008) 812,000 workers from the new member states have 
registered to work in the UK since May 2004 at WRS, and there have been an 
additional 10,540 and 22,080 worker registrations from Bulgaria and Romania, 
respectively.  
These authors warn, however, that the WRS numbers overstate actual 
immigration flows since the registered people are temporary workers, while the size 
of net migration from eight new member states is much lower (71,000 in 2006). 
Drinkwater et al. (2008) analyse the performance of Polish immigrants in the UK 
labour market. Overall, no evidence of “welfare tourism” was found. In most cases, 
the majority of migrants were male, young, tended to come from Poland and the 
Baltic states, had relatively high or medium skill levels and were concentrated in 
relatively low-skilled sectors (or self-employed), pointing to such issues as 
downgrading and transferability of human capital (Blanchflower et al. 2007). Ruhs 
(2007) reports that almost half of the workers who registered under WRS since May 
2004 have taken temporary jobs. 
According to a study by Doyle et al. (2006), which documents the situation in 
Ireland and Sweden, the number of immigrants from the new member states in 
Sweden increased between 2003 and 2005. The authors also argue that the number of 
post-enlargement EU10 immigrants is still small and suggest several reasons for this 
observation, such as few job vacancies, linguistic distance and the lack of established 
migration networks. They report, however, a different situation in Ireland. Although 
there are no data available for Ireland before 2005 which distinguish between 
accession country nationals and foreigners from the rest of the world, there is a 
remarkable increase in the number of foreigners between 2003 and 2005, and the 
  8majority in 2005 were nationals from the new member states. Indeed, Hughes (2007) 
reports that there were about 54,000 EU10 immigrants in May-December 2004, 
112,000 in 2005, and 139,000 in 2006 measured by the Personal Public Service 
Number (PPSN) registration scheme. Barrett et al. (2008) documents that nationals 
from the new member states constituted 3 percent of the Ireland’s population in 2006. 
Remarkably, Brenke and Zimmermann (2007) document an increase in net 
immigration flows from the new member states into Germany, despite the “closed 
door” policy, acting through a rise in self-employment, especially among the Poles.  
As for the sending countries, Iglicka (2005) argues that the majority of 
emigration from Poland to the EU (mainly Germany and the UK) is of a temporary 
nature, and emigration to the West is being replaced by immigration from the East 
(Ukraine) and by return migration. Kaczmarczyk and Okólski (2008) report that the 
accession of Poland and the Baltic states significantly increased emigration from these 
countries, mainly to Ireland and the UK.  
The World Bank (2006) documents that Lithuania is a country with the largest 
emigration rate among the new member states with 3.3 percent of its population 
having emigrated between May 2004 and December 2005, followed by Latvia (2.4 
percent), Slovakia and Poland (1 percent). An interesting observation is that while 
prior to enlargement most Lithuanians migrants went to Germany, Estonia, Russia, 
Ireland and the US, after the enlargement they headed towards the UK and Germany. 
These migrants were predominantly young with medium or high skills. Kadziauskas 
(2007) reports that the number of migrants from Lithuania has increased after the 
enlargement, warning that these outflows may be severely understated by official 
statistics. The World Bank (2006) documents a similar upward trend in emigration 
  9using the Polish Labour Force Survey data, with 20 percent more Poles staying abroad 
in 2004 than in 2003.  
Based on the same data, Kaczmarczyk and Okólski (2008) report that the 
number of Polish residents who stayed abroad for at least two months tripled since 
early 2004 till early 2007 from around 180,000 to around 540,000. Germany remains 
the most important destination country for immigrants from Poland (especially 
regarding seasonal migration), although its share is decreasing while the importance 
of the UK and Ireland is increasing (World Bank, 2006; Frelak and Kazmierkiewicz, 
2007; Kaczmarczyk and Okólski, 2008). Kaczmarczyk and Okólski, (2008) confirm 
the findings from the receiving countries: these migrants tend to be males, work-
oriented, young, relatively well-educated and temporary. The proportion of 
individuals with tertiary education among migrants has increased after the 
enlargement, leading to an emergence of two distinct emigrants groups – low-skilled 
individuals from the periphery and highly-skilled ones form the cores (Kaczmarczyk 
and Okólski, 2008).  
What is the outlook concerning the migration flows from the new to the old 
member states? On the one hand, the emigration intentions are larger in the new EU10 
than in the old EU15. On the other hand, growth in the EU10 and wage convergence, 
as well as new vacancies and skills shortages at home combined with the remaining 
cultural barriers, could negatively influence these migration flows in the future. 
Figure 4 shows that a significant proportion of people in the new member states (15 
percent) is still thinking about "living in another Member State in order to work, but 
haven’t decided yet”. However, a large proportion of respondents have already 
thought about it but gave up the idea.  
 
  104. The Effects of Post-enlargement Migration 
The determinants of migration 
Understanding the determinants of migration flows is crucial for the understanding of 
their composition and characteristics and thus for evaluation of their effects on the 
source and destination countries. It is especially important to distinguish the nature of 
the economic or other migration motifs and their interaction with individual 
characteristics to draw conclusions not only about the skill level and age structure but 
also duration of migration, which all condition the effects of migration on the source 
and destination countries. 
  Early theories of the migration decision stress the significance of (expected) 
regional disparities in prosperity (Harris and Todaro, 1970). These theories imply the 
significance of earnings and income levels, costs of living, unemployment rates, 
quality of public goods, and the generosity of the welfare systems. Theories based on 
the human capital model (Becker, 1964) identify the importance of age, as older 
potential migrants have a shorter expected lifetime gain from moving than younger 
ones. More educated individuals may be in a better position to gain valuable 
information about the destination country, thereby reducing their costs of adjustment 
and thus be more inclined to migrate. Inter-regional cultural, linguistic and 
geographical distances should also affect the adjustment costs and thus affect the 
migration flows. Needless to say, the decision to move is affected by the costs of 
moving which also include, besides the well-understood pecuniary costs, significant 
psychological and social costs of forgone contacts with friends and family as well as 
social contacts. Indeed, family issues, such as having a child or spouse, and broader 
social relationships, such as ethnic networks, play a significant role (Mincer, 1978; 
  11Massey, 1990). While having children may increase the costs of moving, ethnic 
networks may facilitate important information about the destination labour market. 
The character of the earnings distribution in the source country affects the 
migration incentives of high and low skill workers differently. In a country that has a 
relatively flat earnings distribution, the opportunity costs of migration are higher for 
the low skilled workers, who enjoy wealth redistribution in their favour. On the other 
hand, in a country with a relatively steep income distribution, it is the high skilled 
workers who enjoy high returns to skills and have high opportunity costs of migration 
(Borjas, 1985, see also Roy 1951). Overall, migrants may be positively or negatively 
self-selected with respect to their observable and unobservable characteristics, both 
upon entry and exit (Borjas, 1987b, Chiswick, 1999). 
One of the most interesting questions in the European context is whether 
generous welfare systems attract immigrants and whether they affect the type of 
immigrant inflows. Borjas (1999a) studies this issue in a model that assumes variation 
in terms of the generosity of welfare provisions and returns to human capital across 
US states.  The model predicts that, relative to the native population, low-skilled 
immigrants should be more prone to cluster in welfare-generous states and the effect 
of a change in the level of welfare benefits should have stronger effects on 
immigrant’s welfare participation, that is, the benefits elasticity of immigrants should 
be higher than that of the native population. Borjas empirically corroborates the 
prediction of immigrants’ excess propensity to cluster in welfare generous states,         
even when controlling for demographic and socioeconomic factors as well as for 
possible networks effects.  
What are the main determinants of East-West migration flows in an enlarged 
EU? While family and other social relationships, as well as housing and local 
  12environment conditions, are important, Fouarge and Ester (2007a) and Bonin et al. 
(2008) show that employment-related factors, such as higher income, better working 
conditions, and opportunities of finding a suitable job are key migration motivators in 
Europe, and in the new members states in particular. Bonin et al. (2008) show that 
language and cultural barriers also play an important role. The authors do not find 
evidence that migration is primarily attracted by access to welfare payments or better 
public services. This is in line with De Giorgi and Pellizzari (2006), who find, using 
data from the European Community Household Panel, that welfare benefits are a 
factor which influences an immigrant’s choice of destination; however, it is a small 
effect relative to the impact of wages.  
Blanchflower et al. (2007) show that the propensity to migrate is correlated 
with income per capita, unemployment rates, and life satisfaction in the new member 
states. In line with this study, unhappiness with their lives, dissatisfaction with their 
salaries and working conditions, concerns about the availability of good jobs and 
insecurity about their jobs were show by Blanchflower and Lawton (2008) to be some 
of the key reasons to move abroad for Eastern Europeans. Kadziauskas (2007) reports 
that 90 percent of the respondents in Lithuania, a country with high levels of 
emigration, name low salaries as the main motive of seeking employment abroad. 
Zaiceva and Zimmermann (2008) show that linguistic and geographical distances, 
migrant networks, as well as scale seem to have played a role in the allocation of 
migrants across destination countries. So in general, we can conjecture that most of 
the post-enlargement East-West migration flows have been economic in nature, 
pushed by the dissatisfaction with economic opportunities in the new member states 
and attracted by better labour market opportunities in the old member states. Welfare 
does not seem to be a key factor in determining the nature of these migration flows. 
  13The impact of migration on wages and their distribution 
The effects of migration on labour markets are complex and multifaceted. Migration 
involves relocation of workers and thus affects the supply of labour and human capital 
in source and destination labour markets. Depending on the character of the implied 
changes in labour supply, migration may affect wages, employment, and other labour 
market outcomes of not only the natives and stayers, but also of other migrants. As a 
corollary, migration potentially has significant effects on economic inequality.
9 
The impact of immigration on the destination labour market has been 
modelled by a number of studies, including Chiswick, Chiswick and Karras (1992), 
and Chiswick (1980, 1998). In these models, the effects of migration on income 
inequality in receiving countries largely depend on the socioeconomic and 
demographic characteristics of the immigrant and native populations as manifested by 
the substitutability or complementarity of their labour. Concerning the empirical 
evidence for the US, Grossman (1982) finds that foreign-born workers are substitutes 
for native workers, and Borjas (1983) reveals complementarity between Black and 
Hispanic labour, and Hispanic and White male workers. Borjas (1987a) provides 
some evidence that White, Black, Hispanic and Asian immigrant male workers are 
substitutes for Whites born in the US. All these studies report effects of small 
magnitudes.  
  More recent studies, however, provide evidence of diverse and non-negligible 
labour market effects of immigration. Using data from the 1990 US census, Card 
(2001) distinguishes the effects of immigration for various occupational groups and 
finds significant negative employment effects in most cases. In a similar study, 
Orrenius and Zavodny (2007) find negative wage effects of immigration on unskilled 
                                                 
9 Kahanec and Zimmermann (2008a, 2008b) extensively summarize this literature and argue that 
migration potentially has important consequences for economic inequality which are driven by the 
skill-composition of migrant flows. 
  14natives but do not find significant effects in skilled occupations. Borjas, Freeman and 
Katz (1997) report that immigration explains a significant proportion of the increase 
in the wage gap between high and low skill labour in the US in the 1980s and early 
1990s. Negative wage effects of immigrants on their co-ethnics in the same linguistic 
group are reported by Chiswick and Miller (2002). Borjas (1999b, 2003, 2006) and 
Filer (1992) provide further evidence on the negative effects of immigration in the 
US. In a natural experiment setting of the Mariel boatlift, which brought an influx 
45,000 Cubans into Miami in 1980, Card (1990) finds that any effects of unexpected 
immigration were cancelled out by a mobility response of natives and former 
immigrants.  
Considering the international evidence, Roy (1987) reports detrimental effects 
of immigration on native employment prospects in Canada. However, no negative 
employment effects of immigration are found by Akbari and DeVoretz (1992) for 
Canadian natives and Addison and Worswick (2002) for Australian natives. Roy 
(1997) reports no clear patterns of substitutability or complementarity between 
foreign- and Canadian-born labour. Friedberg (2001) finds no negative effects of 
Russian immigration on Israeli wages or employment. On the positive side, Chapman 
and Cobb-Clark (1999), and Parasnis, Fausten and Smyth (2006) find positive effects 
of immigration on the employment prospects of Australian natives 
As concerns Europe, Winkelmann and Zimmermann (1993) find only small 
negative effects of immigration on German employment. Hunt (1992) studies the 
impact of the Algerian repatriates on the French labour market after the Algerian 
independence and finds detrimental yet weak wage and employment effects for the 
natives. Similarly, Carrington and de Lima (1996) find some evidence of negative 
effects on native wages of refugees from the former colonies in Portugal. Angrist and 
  15Kugler (2003) report negative effects of immigration from the former Yugoslavia on 
employment in Europe, especially in countries with more restrictive market 
institutions. However, no negative effects of immigration on employment are reported 
by Pischke and Velling (1997) for Germany, and Dustmann, Fabbri and Preston 
(2005) in the case of the UK. Zorlu and Hartog (2005) report little effects of 
immigration on native wages for the Netherlands, the UK and Norway. De New and 
Zimmermann (1994) support the complementarity hypothesis by finding negative 
effects of (largely unskilled) immigration on the wages of the German unskilled but 
positive wage effects on the wages of native high-skilled. 
  The book “European Migration: what do we know?”, edited by Zimmermann 
(2005), contains 15 chapters on European countries and the US, Canada and New 
Zealand summarising migration experiences since the Second World War. The 
conclusion reached is that immigration is largely beneficial for the receiving 
countries. There can be phases of adjustment, but there is no overall evidence that 
natives' wages are strongly depressed or that unemployment substantially increases as 
a consequence of immigration.  
To evaluate the post enlargement migration flows we need to analyse 
empirical evidence on the quality of post-enlargement migrants, their position in the 
destination labour markets, but also on whether they leave from employment,   
unemployment, or inactivity (see Kaczmarczyk and Okólski, 2008). While aggregate 
statistical data do not identify any causal links, they provide a broad picture of 
economic development in receiving countries in the pre- and post-enlargement period. 
Aberrant patterns in aggregate statistics following enlargement could hint at some 
effects of post enlargement developments, while their normality would be consistent 
  16with the hypothesis that enlargement had no extraordinary effects on the receiving 
labour markets.  
Figure 5 shows that there is no evidence of employment growth slow down 
after the 2004 enlargement in the EU15, Germany and Sweden. Ireland exhibits 
increasing employment growth up until the third quarter of 2005, and deceleration 
thereafter. In the UK employment growth was fairly steady throughout the period. 
Figure 6 documents increasing or steady unemployment rate in the EU15, Germany 
and Sweden up until 2005, and a decline thereafter. The opposite pattern shows up for 
the UK and Ireland. Finally, Figures 7 documents vacancy rates in the EU15, 
Germany, Sweden and the UK, and Figure 8 provides the corresponding figures for 
the manufacturing sector in Germany, Sweden and the UK. The overall picture is that 
there is strong demand for labour in these countries, even in manufacturing, a sector 
with high concentration of the accession countries citizens. In the same vein, average 
wages do not exhibit any observable slow down during the studied period (Figures 9 
and 10). We can thus summarise that aggregate data do not provide discernible signs 
of negative economic effects of post-enlargement migration, perhaps with the 
exception of Ireland and the UK, where employment growth and unemployment rates 
have exhibited some negative trends since 2005. It remains an open question, 
however, whether these can be ascribed to post enlargement migration flows.  
Evidence on the direct effects of post-enlargement migration is still relatively 
scarce, but rising. UK Home Office (2007) provides evidence that immigrant workers 
from the EU10 go to sectors where the demand for their labour is the highest 
(hospitality and catering, agriculture, manufacturing, food processing, and business 
and administration), thus helping to fill the gaps in the UK labour market while 
placing only few demands on the UK welfare system. Gilpin et al. (2006) do not find 
  17any significant effect of immigration from the EU8 on the claimant unemployment 
rate of natives. Blanchflower et al. (2007) also find no negative impact on the British 
economy, hinting at curbing effects of post-enlargement immigrants on inflation. 
Drinkwater et al. (2008) analyse the performance of Polish immigrants in the UK 
labour market using the UK Labour Force Survey data. The authors find evidence of 
“downgrading”, i.e. that the majority of post-enlargement immigrants have found 
employment in low-skilled and low-paying jobs despite having relatively high levels 
of education. Hughes (2007) argues that foreign workers continued to replace Irish 
workers in the manufacturing sector, but that earnings growth has recently increased. 
Moreover, he goes on to argue that the recent vacancies data show that the demand for 
labour remained strong after the enlargement. This is in line with Doyle et al. (2006), 
who argue that displacement does not appear to affect the Irish labour market 
negatively since the aggregate unemployment rate remain stable, and even if some 
displacement takes place, native workers probably move to better-paying jobs. 
Concerning the sending countries, aggregate data document decreasing 
unemployment, increasing number of vacancies, and employment growth, as well as 
increasing wages in the post-enlargement period (see Figures 11-14).
10 However, 
emigration of skilled specialists may exacerbate structural weaknesses in national 
labour markets (World Bank, 2006). Kadziauskas (2007) reports that in Lithuania 
there were around 12,000 unfilled vacancies, especially in manufacturing and trade 
sectors, at the end of 2005. In Poland, Kaczmarczyk and Okólski (2008) document 
similar shortages especially in manufacturing, trade and construction, arguing that 
around 80 percent of the registered job seekers do not match regional labour market 
requirements. A consequence of such mismatch is increased demand for immigrant 
                                                 
10 The World Bank (2006) warns that increasing wages may generate inflation pressures. 
  18labour, as documented for Poland, where the number of immigrants in 2004 was the 
highest since 1960, mainly coming form Ukraine, Belarus and Russia (Frelak and 
Kazmierkiewicz, 2007; Iglicka, 2005). Iglicka (2005) argues that post-enlargement 
emigration from Poland has contributed to the decrease in the aggregate 
unemployment rate in Poland after 2004, and that there already exist shortages of low 
and medium skilled workers, lending evidence of a mismatch between jobs and 
workers. One needs to be careful when interpreting these results as causal, however: 
overall restructuring and business cycle, rather than emigration, may be the key 
driving factors (Rutkowski, 2007; Kaczmarczyk and Okólski, 2008) 
Kahanec and Zimmermann (2008a) provide and empirically test a theoretical 
model that predicts a positive (negative) effect of skilled (unskilled) immigration on 
earnings inequality in developed destination countries with relatively high shares of 
skilled workers. The effects in source countries, similarly, depend on the skill level of 
those who leave and the skill composition of the labour force. In the context of EU 
enlargement, the labour force in the EU is relatively skilled. This would imply that in 
sending (receiving) skilled migration increases (decreases) inequality and unskilled 
migration decreases (increases) it. According to this argument, brain circulation 
between sending and receiving countries can be expected to generate a win-win 
situation in terms of reduction in inequality in both sending and receiving countries.  
 
The consequences of migration for welfare systems 
The question of whether immigrants use welfare more or less intensively than natives 
has generated the most papers in the general area of immigrants and welfare.
11 
Brücker et al. (2002) discuss a number of reasons why such native-immigrant 
                                                 
11 See Barrett and McCarthy (2008) for an extensive summary of the literature. 
  19differences could arise. First, immigrants may have unobserved characteristics that 
make them more prone to choose to migrate to countries with more generous welfare 
systems (self-selection). For example, economic migrants are typically less likely to 
claim welfare benefits, but their dependants or non-economic migrants are more likely 
to become welfare claimants. Second, employers’ discrimination may disadvantage 
immigrants in the labour market by reducing their chances to obtain employment. 
Third, language problems or psychological trauma may lead immigrants to be more 
dependent on welfare benefits. Fourth, legislation in the host country may exclude 
immigrants’ from participating in welfare systems. Fifth, ethnic enclaves may 
facilitate immigrant employment, for instance by providing relevant information 
about the labour market, but may also lead to separation from the host society. Thus, 
ethnic enclaves and networks may decrease or increase immigrants’ welfare use, 
depending on which of the two effects prevails. Finally, any factor that leads 
immigrants to be in low-pay or low-quality employment, such as exclusion from 
public employment, also tends to reduce their capacity to provide for themselves and 
thus increases their probability of welfare use.   
Considering the US evidence, Jensen (1988) compares unadjusted rates of 
welfare receipt and finds only a marginally greater probability that an immigrant is on 
welfare compared to a native. Once he controls for relevant characteristics, it even 
turns out that immigrant households are less likely to be among the recipients of 
welfare benefits. However, Borjas and Hilton (1996) show that if non-cash benefits 
are accounted for, the immigrants appear to be more likely to be in welfare receipt 
than natives. Borjas and Trejo (1991) report a cohort effect concerning immigrants’ 
welfare use: as opposed to earlier immigrant cohorts, more recent immigrants are 
more likely to be among recipients of welfare benefits. Furthermore, their welfare use 
  20is increasing with the length of stay in the U.S: the longer their stay, the more likely 
they are to be in receipt of welfare benefits, which implies assimilation into welfare 
rather than out of it.  
For a European perspective of this area, Brücker et al. (2002) carry out an EU-
wide analysis. Using the European Community Household Panel (1994-1996) they 
study the relative rates of welfare use for non-EU immigrants in eleven of the EU15 
countries, assessing whether there is an “immigrant” effect on welfare receipt when 
controlling for individual characteristics, such as education or family situation. Their 
results suggest that two groups of countries can be defined. One group contains 
Germany, the UK, Greece and Spain, where the rates of welfare receipt for non-EU 
immigrants and EU citizens are similar. In some instances, it is even lower for 
immigrants. The other group of countries, comprising Denmark, the Netherlands, 
Belgium, France, Austria and Finland, includes those where there is a significantly 
higher rate of welfare use among non-EU immigrants than the natives. When 
controlling for observable characteristics, non-EU immigrants have an immigrant 
impact on unemployment benefits in Denmark, the Netherlands, France, Austria and 
Finland, but no such effects in Germany, the UK, Greece or Spain. The evidence of 
welfare dependency of post-enlargement migrants is scarce. One exception is Doyle et 
al. (2006), who find no evidence of "welfare tourism" in Ireland, and argue that the 
immigration to Ireland is primarily demand-driven and does not affect native 
employment significantly. 
From a different perspective, Äslund and Fredriksson (2005) look at the 
impact of immigrant networks on immigrant welfare receipt in Sweden.
12 Their quasi-
experimental approach alleviates the issue of the endogeneity of locational choice and 
                                                 
12 See Borjas and Hilton (1996) and Hao and Kawano (2001) for evidence on the US. See also 
Wadensjö (2007) on immigrant inflows to Sweden. 
  21thus enables conclusions to be drawn about neighbourhood effects on individuals. 
They make use of a government housing programme which took place in the late 
1980s, whereby communities were selected for refugees. Their findings suggest that it 
is rather the rate of welfare receipt among their co-ethnics rather than the size of their 
population that affects individual likelihood to be in receipt of welfare. They estimate 
a near 7 percent increase in the rate of welfare receipt when there is a 10 percent 
increase in the number of welfare dependents among the co-ethnics.   
  As for the sending countries, the significant outflows of young and skilled 
individuals may have negative impacts on demographic situation and public budgets. 
For example, Kadziauskas (2007) estimates that the elderly dependency ratio will 
more than double by 2050 in Lithuania, and unless significant policy change occurs 
(e.g. adjusting the age of eligibility), the social security system may fail entirely. 
Significant decline in population and labour force over the next 50 years was also 
forecasted for Poland, posing serious threat on its labour market and public budgets 
(Kaczmarczyk and Okólski, 2008). In a similar vein, Kupiszewski and Bijak (2007) 
warn about the demographic consequences of post-enlargement out-migration and 
their effects on the labour market as well as social security system in Poland. 
However, if the current migration flows lead to efficient brain circulation, 
empowering people to leave inactivity, increase their human capital abroad, and then 
utilise it at home, current outflows of migrants from new member states may in fact 
lead to more stable welfare systems in the medium or long run. 
 
The growth effects of migration 
Economic migration typically contributes to a more efficient allocation of production 
factors, most notably human capital, thereby improving the prospects for economic 
  22growth. Indeed, some of the main arguments for increased geographic mobility are 
economic. Perhaps even more important than these direct effects are the indirect 
effects on productivity and growth through technology transfer. Indeed, skilled 
migrants often act as agents of knowledge transfer. On the other hand, the loss of the 
best and brightest participants in the work force to developed countries, commonly 
known as the “brain drain”, may have adverse effects on source economies. In view of 
circular migration, the resultant transfer of human capital and knowledge represents a 
“brain circulation” between the host country and the country of emigration. This 
phenomenon is giving way to a more complex process of sharing information between 
the immigrants’ countries of origin and destination, which is being fuelled by a 
continual fall in the costs of international travel and communications. Additional 
second-order effects arise through the supply of labour and skills, which is a function 
of migrant flows, that affects investors' decisions on the allocation of their 
investments and thus technologies in the global context.
 13 
With these factors in mind, it is necessary to stress that although migration 
may change the economic growth rate simply through changing the size of the labour 
force, it does not necessarily affect per capita income. A social planner who was 
concerned not only with maximisation of national income, but also about its 
distribution, would therefore aim at per capita growth. Complementarities in the 
labour market and improved skill matching are a prerequisite for positive per capita 
economic growth effects, as well as externalities through educational choices, human 
capital formation, and those of a fiscal nature. 
Much of the literature on brain circulation focuses on the economic and 
growth aspects of geographic mobility, especially when talking about the brain 
                                                 
13 The implied industrial structure has further repercussions for the adjustment capacity in case of 
economic shocks.  
  23circulation and youth mobility aspects of migration.
14 A number of studies have 
calculated quite large additional income growth from extending the free circulation of 
human capital.
15 This overall conclusion is also in agreement with studies attempting 
to forecast potential migration and any welfare gain or loss resulting from EU 
enlargement.
16 
A potential negative externality of the brain gain and circulation aspects of 
geographic mobility may be a loss of economic potential in the sending countries that 
experience a brain and labour force loss. On the other hand, migrants are often not 
required, economically speaking, in their region of origin at the time of the migration 
decision, and can be found moving from unemployment in the region of origin into 
employment in the destination region. A recent IMF-study
17 concludes that human 
capital flight, especially in the case of doctors and teachers, generates a permanent 
reduction of per capita income growth rate in the country of emigration. When 
considering the drain of young, well educated people, another potential negative 
externality of geographic mobility is governed by the fact that this part of the labour 
force is, in relative terms, the most inventive: it has the most recent edition of human 
capital, and would bear, if the members of the labour force were to stay in the country 
of origin, the highest fiscal burden over the course of their lives. However, different 
studies do point to the positive innovation, productivity and export potentials of 
geographic mobility when considering brain gain and circulation.
18 
Migration of highly skilled workers has repercussions for technological and 
scientific progress measured as innovation that are likely to affect the future growth 
                                                 
14  See Bonin et al. (2008) for an extensive review of the literature. 
15 See for example Bloom and Grant (2001), European Foundation for the Improvement of Living and 
Working Conditions (2006), and Kaba (2004). 
16 See, for example, Alvarez-Plata et al. (2003). 
17 See IMF (2005) and Kaba (2004). 
18 See Branstetter (2001) and Peri (2005). 
  24rates of per capita income. Indeed, such repercussions include discoveries and 
technological improvements that get transferred on total factor productivity. Several 
empirical studies which analysed innovation as measured by the number of patents 
have captured such positive effects of highly educated and talented workers on the 
rate of scientific and technological innovation of a country. A study by Wasmer et al. 
(2006) arrived at the conclusion that in the long run the most important effects of 
immigration might be those on the innovation potential of the economy, as highly 
skilled experts repeatedly migrating between source and destination countries often 
function as major catalysts for expanding knowledge, businesses and venture 
initiatives. A consequence of their actions is a general enhancement of cross border 
knowledge transaction and exports.
19  
These potential positive externalities may, however, be outweighed by the risk 
that out-migration of highly productive and well-educated members of the labour 
force reduces the average productivity of the sending country. In such a context, as 
highlighted by Straubhaar et al. (2000), limited mobility could allow industries to 
make more efficient use of firm- or country-specific knowledge in production. 
However, such potential negative externality of migration is rather hard to document 
empirically.  
The evidence on these effects in the context of post-enlargement migration 
flows in Europe is unfortunately limited. Brücker (2007) argues that migration from 
the new member states yields substantial gains for the GDP of an enlarged EU in the 
long-run, and that migrants themselves are the main winners of free movement. He 
contends further that the effects on the natives in sending and receiving countries are 
ambiguous and, in general, rather small. Wasmer et al. (2006) suggest that the 
                                                 
19 See also Teferra (2004), Kaba (2004), and Saxenian (2002). 
  25economic and social dynamism in the 2004 and 2007 accession states will, sooner or 
later, draw skilled immigrants homeward. Those who choose not to return home will 
still contribute to the economic efficiency of both sending and receiving countries by 
acting as intermediaries: they will connect businesses which are based in Western 
Europe to their home regions. 
In summary, the consequences on brain gain and circulation resulting from 
geographic mobility may be economically favourable for both the sending and 
receiving country. If the effect is one mainly of a brain drain scenario, the sending 
country can experience of multitude of negative externalities. Whether or not the total 
outcome is positive is hindered by the difficulty in estimating the exact size of the 
different effects arising from the positive and negative externalities.  
 
The temporal dimension of migration 
One of the key factors behind the dynamism and circularity of migration are the 
temporal choices of migrants. Whether the observed migration flows and thus their 
effects are temporary or persistent determines which of the aspects of circular 
migration shapes the costs and benefits for sending and receiving countries. Although 
source countries may worry about the emigration of their most able workers and 
losing them to the brain drain, they may simultaneously gain know-how and human 
capital through return migration as brain gain. Migrants may move from 
unemployment in the sending country to employment in the receiving country, and 
then return to the sending country as easily employable workers with additional skills. 
While research in this area in post-enlargement Europe is scarce, it seems that much 
of the migration is of a temporary nature, and that the aforementioned measures on 
gross inflows are likely to overstate the long-term permanent immigration. According 
  26to Home Office (2008) figures, 60 percent of the applicants in the United Kingdom in 
March 2008 intended to stay for less than three months. Epstein and Radu (2007) also 
report evidence in line with this finding in the case of Romania. 
  The issue, as discussed by Constant and Zimmermann (2008), of whether 
migrants adjust over time to become like natives or whether they stay distinct in terms 
of their economic characteristics and outcomes are yet to be explored in the post-
enlargement context. It appears that temporary migrants typically do not invest in the 
destination country's specific human capital; and even long-term immigrants often do 
not fully adjust to the economic conditions in the destination country. The degree and 




Migrants, especially temporary ones, typically have relatives in their country of 
origin. Such social relationships often channel financial resources to the source 
countries, as people working abroad transfer a part of the money earned to support the 
family back home. These flows are further increased by migrants planning to return to 
their country of origin and invest there accordingly. Migrant remittances are often 
substantial and affect the source and destination economies directly: not only through 
wealth transfers, which may be distributed unequally, but also indirectly, especially 
through the labour market choices of remittance recipients. When economies become 
dependent on the remittances, the adverse incentives that such dependency may create 
can slow down economic development. 
The literature on the effects of emigration on various measures of inequality in 
sending rural areas of poor countries dates back to Lipton (1977), who argues that 
  27such emigration increases interpersonal and inter-household inequality within and 
between rural villages.
20 A number of studies addressing this issue in national and 
international settings deliver conflicting findings: the direction of effects depends on 
applied methodologies, type of migration, and stages of the studied migration 
histories.
21 Stark, Taylor and Yitzhaki (1986) found that remittances from emigrants 
reduced income inequality in a Mexican village with an extensive experience of 
emigration to the US. In a later study Stark, Taylor and Yitzhaki (1988) use an 
extended Gini index of inequality to examine the sensitivity of the estimated positive 
effect of remittances from the US on a Mexican village. They find that this effect 
decreases as incomes of people at the bottom of the distribution are assigned higher 
weights. In contrast, Adams (1989) finds that remittances increased inequality in three 
Egyptian villages comparing the actual migration history to the no migration 
counterfactual. Replicating the study for four Pakistani villages (Adams, 1992), he 
finds neutral effects, however. Barham and Boucher (1998), find that migration 
reduces inequality, assuming exogeneity of remittances, while finding the opposite 
effects when endogeneity of remittances is accounted for. In fact, a recent World 
Bank report (World Bank, 2006) concludes that migration helps alleviate poverty in 
the sending country, regardless if the migrant is educated or not. The report goes on to 
state that remittances mean less child labour, more hours worked in self employment, 
and a higher education rate of people starting capital intensive enterprises – all 
together with positive impacts on economic growth. And the greater the proportion of 
the remittances directed into human capital or physical investment, rather than 
consumption, the greater the positive impact on the country which receives them. But 
                                                 
20 See Kahanec and Zimmermann (2008a). 
21 See Stark, Taylor and Yitzhaki (1986, 1988), Taylor (1992), Adams (1989, 1992), Lipton (1980), 
Stahl (1982), Barham and Boucher (1998) and McKenzie and Rapoport (2006). 
  28even if remittances are just consumed by the recipient and no investment externalities 
arise, welfare increases. 
22 
As an exception to the general scarcity of literature on remittances in post-
enlargement Europe, Epstein and Radu (2007) highlight the role of remittances for the 
Romanian economy. In general, remittances constitute a significant share of country's 
GDP in Bulgaria and Romania, but also in the Baltic states (Figure 15). Figure 16 
shows that the countries can be divided into two groups: one in which remittances 
have increased from 2004 till 2005 (Poland, Lithuania, but also Bulgaria and 
Romania); and another one in which workers’ remittances have decreased after the 
enlargement (Latvia, Estonia, Hungary, Slovenia). Kaczmarczyk and Okólski (2008) 
report that remittances equalled 2.6 percent of GDP in Estonia, 2.5 percent in Latvia, 
2.1 percent in Lithuania, and 1.3 percent in Poland; and that their volume also 
increased substantially after the enlargement in Estonia and Lithuania. In the case of 
Poland, most of the money earned abroad is spent in Poland, mostly on consumption, 
but more recently also on investment (World Bank 2006; Kaczmarczyk and Okólski, 
2008). The remittances are mostly of a seasonal nature in Poland and the Baltic states 
pointing to a temporary seasonal pattern of migration from these countries 
(Kaczmarczyk and Okólski, 2008).  
 
5. Case Studies  
To better understand the topics discussed, we examine several case studies providing 
a more detailed account of the effects of post-enlargement migration in source and 
destination countries. We first look at differences in welfare receipt in four destination 
                                                 
22 See also World Bank (2007). 
 
  29countries.
23 We then study the effects of emigration on the Polish economy, and 




Sweden is a country with a tradition of an extensive and encompassing welfare 
system, which is relatively open to immigration. Hansen and Lofstrom (2003) analyse 
longitudinal administrative dataset compiled over the years between 1990 and 1996 to 
assess whether immigrants exhibit a more intensive use of welfare compared to 
natives. They find that although immigrants account for just a tenth of the population 
in Sweden, the social assistance expenditure on them is equivalent to the amount 
spent on natives. The result that immigrants are more likely to receive welfare than 
natives is robust to controlling for individual characteristics. However, welfare receipt 
decreases with length of stay: immigrants tend to assimilate out of welfare. Yet, the 
authors conclude that this rate of convergence is not sufficiently high to erode 
differences between the propensity of welfare receipt of natives and immigrants in the 
long-run. Expanding this framework, Hansen and Lofstrom (forthcoming) study the 
native-immigrant differences in transition rates between employment, unemployment 
and social assistance receipt. They report that the degree of structural state 
dependence is significantly greater among refugees than among natives. However, 
non-refugee immigrants are similar to natives in this respect. This has important 
consequences for welfare policy design, as these need to reflect the different 
underlying mechanisms that govern welfare use among refugee and non-refugee 
immigrants.  
                                                 
23 We draw on Barrett and McCarthy (2008). 
  30Hansen and Lofstrom (2006) focus on transitions in and out of welfare. They 
examine longitudinal administrative data over a longer time period (1991-2001). 
Their findings show that differences between the rates of welfare receipt exhibited by 
immigrants and natives result from a higher rate of entry into welfare and not a lower 
rate of exit out of it. Their results also suggest that the key driver of the difference in 
welfare receipt between natives and immigrants are the time invariant differences in 
unobserved characteristics rather than the differences in observable characteristics 
between the two groups. 
So in general, it appears that immigrants are overrepresented among welfare 
recipients in Sweden. Does this hold for those arriving from the new member states? 
A study by Andrén (2007) tackles the question of welfare use in a dynamic 
framework, examining the extent of structural state dependency for immigrants and 
Swedes. His findings indicate that although state dependence is witnessed in both 
groups, the effect is three times larger for immigrants. However, Andrén does not find 
any significant effect of being of an Eastern European origin on welfare use in the 
1990s.   
The study of Wadensjö (2007) shows that this result holds even after the 2004 
EU enlargement. Studying the people born in one of the new member states and 
comparing them to those born in Sweden at the end of 2005, Wadensjö documents 
that these immigrants are overrepresented in some sectors of the Swedish economy; 
earn somewhat lower wages other things equal; and, remarkably, they are not 
overrepresented in various income transfer programs.  
 
  31Germany 
We now turn to the case of Germany, a country with an extensive welfare system and 
a more restrictive immigration policy, fully applying transitional arrangements vis-à-
vis the nationals of the new member states. Following a study by Frick et al. (1999), 
which showed that an immigrant living in Germany was 3.7 times more likely to 
receive benefits compared to a native, Castronova et al. (2001) attempt to explain the 
difference. They examine whether it is higher rates of eligibility or higher rates of 
taking up welfare, conditional on eligibility, which account for the discrepancy. They 
conclude that there is no difference in the rate of taking up welfare payments between 
immigrants and natives, but immigrants are more likely to be eligible to claim welfare 
due to their income or social situation 
Riphahn (2004) examines the role of differences in group characteristics in 
explaining the differences in welfare use between natives and immigrants. She finds 
that the immigrants’ characteristics explain their higher propensity to be in welfare 
receipt and that dropping out of the labour force is a considerably stronger predictor 
of welfare use for an immigrant than for a native. However, she finds neither an 
“immigrant effect”, nor an “assimilation effect”. Her results show quite the opposite: 
the longer an immigrant stays in Germany, the greater the likelihood of receiving 
benefits.  
The evidence on welfare use of post enlargement migrants from Eastern 
Europe is scarce. The aforementioned studies, however, hint at a conjecture that, other 
things equal, immigrants in Germany are not more likely to be recipients of welfare 
benefits, and that this might hold for the post-enlargement migrants from the new 
member states as well.  
  32Ireland 
Ireland is an interesting case study when comparing the receipt of welfare between 
immigrants and natives: Barrett and McCarthy (2007) find that immigrants in Ireland 
are less intensive users of the welfare system. The raw figures imply that immigrants' 
probability of being among welfare recipients is just one half of the corresponding 
probability for the natives. This finding could be explained by the high levels of 
immigrants' educational attainment in Ireland. Barrett and McCarthy (2007) 
investigate this issue and find that lower rates of welfare use among immigrants 
persist even when controlling for standard socio-economic factors, including 
education. When unemployed immigrants and natives are compared, they conclude 
that immigrants are significantly less likely to be in receipt of welfare. However, this 
could be a result of eligibility requirements rather than lower residual take-up rates. 
Barrett and McCarthy (2008) use the 2005 wave of the EU Survey of Income and 
Living Conditions, largely confirming the results found in their 2007 paper that used 
the 2004 wave of the same dataset. While the data do not permit distinguishing 
between immigrants from the new member states, they constitute a large proportion of 
the group labelled “non-English speaking” origin. These immigrants are found to be 8 
percent less likely to be among welfare recipients, ceteris paribus. This finding may 
be due to the two-year residency requirement for welfare receipt in Ireland.  The 
authors also find that immigrants of non-English speaking origin are less likely to be 
among welfare recipients if unemployed, and receive significantly lower welfare 
payments. Barrett and McCarthy (2008) conclude that immigrants do not seem to 
pose any significant burden on the Irish welfare system. 
 
  33Poland 
Literature on remittances in post-enlargement Europe is scarce, but a pioneering study 
by Kaczmarczyk and Okólski (2008) summarises the evidence on Poland and 
provides several findings. Although Poland has a longstanding tradition of emigration, 
its EU accession triggered substantial additional outflows of people, who mainly 
headed to Ireland and the UK, but are visible in all pre-2004 EU and EEA countries.  
Polish migrants became the largest immigrant group by inflows in a number of 
countries, most notably Ireland and the UK.
24 According to Kaczmarczyk and 
Okólski, the post-enlargement migrant flows are structurally different from those 
prior to the enlargement. Not only do the flows appear to be more individualistic and 
regular, but legally speaking they are more solidly based and more diversified with 
respect to both immigrant characteristics and destination countries. In the area of age 
and education, Polish workers fare well: the post-enlargement migrants from Poland 
are younger and better educated. Two trends seem to be at work here: the emigration 
of “redundant” labour from peripheries contributing to better labour and human 
capital allocation; and the emigration of high-skilled workers from economic cores. 
This could be a first sign of brain circulation. EU enlargement thus had a significant 
effect on the Polish labour market. While more time is needed for all the effects to 
unfold, it is already clear now that Poland, and more generally new member states 
with significant out-migration, will need to adapt to the outflows of their skilled 




                                                 
24 There is also evidence of substantial inflows of Polish migrants in Germany. See the section on 
Polish-German migration flows below. 
  34Polish-German migration 
We now evaluate the effects (and determinants) of migration flows for Poland and 
Germany. There are two reasons why Poland was selected as a source country and 
Germany as a destination country. Firstly, the effects of post-enlargement migration 
are relatively well understood in the case of more open destination countries, such as 
the UK, Ireland or Sweden. Germany, by contrast, is a country that fully applies 
transitional measures and yet receives significant numbers of immigrants from new 
member states. Thus Germany is a good example to enable us to shed light on the 
lesser known facts about post-enlargement migration. Second, most immigrants from 
the new member states in Germany come from Poland (as is also the case for many 
other old member states). 
According to Brenke and Zimmermann (2007) there were about 530,000 
foreigners in Germany in 2006 who had citizenship of one of the 2004-enlargement 
new member states. They came mainly from Poland, Slovakia, Hungary and the 
Czech Republic, and are mostly of the first generation. They constitute about 8 
percent of the foreigner population in Germany and about 20 percent of them had a 
German spouse (80 percent of these were women). Although these foreigners have 
lower participation rates than natives and foreigners originating from the EU15, they 
outperform all other immigrant groups. This pattern is mirrored in the unemployment 
rates.  Furthermore, these immigrants exhibit rates of self-employment higher than the 
natives; however, they are lower than those of immigrants from Asia or the EU15. 
The immigrants from the new member states are also distinguished in having good 
educational and occupational attainment, albeit lower than Germans without 
immigrant backgrounds; but somewhat higher than Germans with such background.  
  35Brenke and Zimmermann (2008) continue their study to examine the effect of 
the 2004 enlargement. They observe for the most part a significant positive effect on 
immigration from EU8, mainly from Poland. Most of these migrants are of prime age, 
mainly in the 25-35 age group, and exhibit higher participation rates and lower 
unemployment rates than other immigrants arriving in the same period. A relatively 
high proportion of these migrants have middle levels of education and not too many 
are in the high-education group. This finding is consistent with the hypothesis that the 
closed-door policy led to a diversion of high skilled migrants to more open countries, 
like the UK and Ireland, and those who migrated to Germany concentrated on semi-
skilled occupations operating as self-employed. Furthermore, a large share of these 
migrants is self-employed. This suggests that a closed-door policy motivates 
immigrants to find inventive ways how to penetrate the labour market, in our case 
using self-employment as means to avoid restrictions imposed on immigrants in wage 
employment. That Polish immigrants in Germany are somewhat older and their 
educational distribution has a thin upper tail may indicate the role of linguistic and 
geographical factors. Namely, it is the young and highly skilled that are the most 
mobile and thus willing to migrate to more distant labour markets. Furthermore, the 
tradition of speaking German is stronger among the older generations in Poland, 
whereas English is the dominant second language among the young. 
 
6. Summary and Policy Conclusions 
The objectives of the EU, as outlined in the Lisbon Agenda and the European 
Employment Strategy and Social Agenda, are the development and application of 
first-rate migration practices and policies. The achievement of these aims is not 
  36possible outside the framework of a better understanding of the determinants and 
effects of migration.  
Our analysis is a contemporary perspective focusing on the five years after the 
2004 enlargements. The importance and relevance of this report is based on several 
insights that consistently came out from the comparative study of various aspects of 
migration, its determinants and effects, and a number of case studies. First, we 
comprehensively and comparatively describe the landscape of post-enlargement 
migration trajectories and their relationships to labour markets, social security 
systems and growth, identifying the policy considerations and stylised facts of 
migration in an enlarged EU. We find that EU enlargement had a significant impact 
on migration flows from new to old member states. While we do observe various 
forms of migrant diversion to those old member states that adopted the open-door 
policy, countries like Germany or Austria, which have not opened their labour 
markets, have also experienced significant inflows of migrants from the new member 
states. We also observe some signs that if diversion occurred, it mostly worked 
through migrants’ characteristics, whereby more open economies attracted more 
educated and younger migrants.  
Second, we provide an in-depth analysis of the effects of migration in the three 
important areas: labour markets, welfare systems, and growth. Not only does this 
advance our understanding of these effects in the source and destination countries, but 
it also allows us to evaluate the relationships between the effects in these domains, as 
well as between determinants and effects of migration from the selection perspective. 
Our findings by and large confirm the international evidence on this issue: any 
negative effects in the labour market on wages or employment are hard to detect. In 
fact, there is evidence that post-enlargement migration contributes to growth 
  37prospects of the EU by ensuring a better allocation of human capital, that these 
migrants are strongly attached to the labour market, and that they are quite unlikely to 
be among welfare recipients.  
Third, these results are strengthened by a study of a matrix of country case 
studies, where we highlight the different labour market and welfare effects in the 
source and destination countries, as well as across countries with different transitional 
arrangements. The case study on migration flows between a sending and a receiving 
country – Poland and Germany – further deepens our understanding of the effects of 
migration and their interaction with the determinants and institutional framework of 
migration flows, quite in line with our general results.  
Fourth, throughout the study we look into the specific migration issues in the 
market for high-skilled labour as one of the main determinants of the growth potential 
of the EU, highlighting the role of brain circulation.  
In summary, we offer a number of insights relevant for the development of 
migration policies and good practice in dealing with migration issues. While our 
ambition was not to provide an exhaustive account of such practices, we point out the 
difficulties that restrictions on the free movement of workers bring about, including 
the forgone increase in the efficiency of human capital allocation at the transnational 
level, and the diversion of migration flows at the country level. We also highlight the 
important positive role of brain circulation for the sending as well as receiving 
countries. We thus believe that the free movement of workers constitutes not only a 
fundamental principle of the European Union, but also a key precondition to reap the 
benefits from the opportunities offered in the labour market, to ensure sustainability 
of member states’ welfare systems, and to strengthen the EU’s global 
competitiveness. 
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Table 1. Proportion of foreign-born and foreign citizens in European Union 
countries by region of origin 
 
 Foreign  citizens  Foreign-born 
  Other EU  Non-EU  Other EU  Non-EU 
EU15:        
Austria 4.1  5.0  6.7  8.7 
Belgium 6.4  2.6  6.8  6.7 
Denmark 2.9
2 2.4  2.0 4.6 
Finland 0.7  1.0  1.4  1.8 
France 2.3  3.3  3.4  7.8 
Germany
  3.1 2.8  n.a.  n.a. 
Greece 1.3  4.8 1.7  5.9 
Ireland 5.4
1 2.6
1   8.8
1   3.4
1  
Italy
2  1.3 3.8  2.2  5.3 
Luxembourg 41.2  5.6  37.9  8.6 
The Netherlands  1.7  1.9  2.8  9.1 
Portugal 0.6  2.8  1.8  5.7 
Spain 3.9  8.3  4.5  10.0 
Sweden 2.5  2.7  5.5  10.0 
UK 2.6  4.3  3.5  8.8 
        
EU12:        
Bulgaria (0.1)
4 (0.1)  n.a.  n.a. 
Cyprus 8.1  6.5  8.1  11.0 
Czech Republic  0.4 0.4  1.3  0.6 
Estonia 0.7  16.8  0.6
4 13.6 
Hungary 0.5  0.2  1.3  0.4 
Latvia n.a.  0.7
3  1.1
4 9.6 
Lithuania   n.a.  (0.6)  (0.3)
 4 3.8 
Malta 1.2  1.8  1.7
5 3.0 
Poland (0.1)  0.1  0.2  0.3 
Romania 0.1
2 0.1  n.a.  (0.1)
 1 




 4 (0.2)  (0.7)
 5 4.6 
 
Source: Bonin et al. (2008) Figures 1, 2 and 3 for foreign-born and Figures 4, 5 and Tables 
A5 and A6 for foreign nationals. 
Notes: In percent of total population, 2006. “Other EU” and “Non EU” refer to the EU27 as 
region of reference. “n.a.” refers to not available.  Share of active working age residents is 
reported. Data in brackets are as in Bonin et al. (2008) and lack reliability due to small 
sample size.  
1 Data are from 2005. 
2 Data are from 2004. 
3 The number for non-EU citizens is suspiciously low, and similar low numbers are reported 
in the 2005 Labour Force Survey. This may arise because non-citizens were grouped 
together with nationals as in Eurostat Population Statistics (2006, p. 65). 
4 residents of EU10 and EU2 only. 
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Source: Data are from Eurostat Population Statistics (2006), Table F-1 p. 95 (till 2000), and Eurostat 
Yearbook (2008), Table SP.22, p. 67 (from 2000 onwards).  
Notes: In 1,000 of persons, 1960s-2005. Net migration is estimated as the difference between total 
population growth and natural increase and includes adjustments and corrections. Annual averages for 
the periods 1960-64, 1965-69, …, 1995-99 are reported. For Cyprus starting from 1975 government-
controlled area only. 2000-2001: corrections due to census.   
 
 













Source: Eurostat Yearbook 2006-7, Eurostat Yearbook 2008. 

























Source: Eurostat Yearbook 2006-7, Eurostat Yearbook 2008. 
Notes: In percent, 1998-2006. 
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Source: Authors’ tabulations from the Eurobarometer EB 65.1. 
Notes: Response to “Have you yourself ever considered living in another Member State in order to 



































Source: Authors calculations based on data from Eurostat online database for Population and Social 
Conditions / Labour Market / Employment and unemployment (Labour Force Survey) available at: 
http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/portal/page?_pageid=1090,30070682,1090_30298591&_dad=portal&_
schema=PORTAL 
Notes: In percent, 2003Q1-2008Q1. The indicator employment growth gives the change in percentage 
from one year to another of the total number of employed persons on the economic territory of the 
country or the geographical area. The indicator is based on the European System of Accounts. 
 
 

























Source: Authors calculations based on data from Eurostat online database for Population and Social 
Conditions / Labour Market / Employment and unemployment (Labour Force Survey) available at: 
http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/portal/page?_pageid=1090,30070682,1090_30298591&_dad=portal&_
schema=PORTAL 
Notes: In percent, 2003Q1-2008Q1. Seasonally adjusted. Unemployment rates represent unemployed 
persons as a percentage of the labour force. The labour force is the total number of people employed 
and unemployed. Unemployed persons comprise persons aged 15 to 74 who were: a) without work 
during the reference week; b) currently available for work, i.e. were available for paid employment or 
self-employment before the end of the two weeks following the reference week; c) actively seeking 
work, i.e. had taken specific steps in the four weeks period ending with the reference week to seek paid 


































Source: Authors calculations based on data from Eurostat online database for Population and Social 
Conditions / Labour Market / Job vacancy statistics available at: 
http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/portal/page?_pageid=1090,30070682,1090_30298591&_dad=portal&_
schema=PORTAL 
Notes: In percent, 2003Q1-2008Q2. A job vacancy is defined as a post (newly created, unoccupied or 
about to become vacant), for which the employer is taking active steps to find a suitable candidate from 
outside the enterprise concerned and is prepared to take more steps; and which the employer intends to 
fill either immediately or in the near future. The data for Ireland are not available. For the EU15 and 
Germany, provisional values are reported. 
 
 






















Source: Authors calculations based on data from Eurostat online database for Population and Social 
Conditions / Labour Market / Job vacancy statistics  available at: 
http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/portal/page?_pageid=1090,30070682,1090_30298591&_dad=portal&_
schema=PORTAL 
Notes: In percent, 2003Q1-2008Q2. For definitions see notes to Figure 7. The data for Ireland and 


































Source: Authors calculations based on data from Eurostat online database for Population and Social 
Conditions / Labour Market / Labour costs available at: 
http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/portal/page?_pageid=1090,30070682,1090_30298591&_dad=portal&_
schema=PORTAL 
Notes: Wages and salaries, 2003Q1-2008Q2. Index 2000=100. Wages and salaries in industries and 
services excluding public administration, seasonally adjusted and adjusted by working days, nominal 
value. Data for EU15 is not available.  
 
 
























Source: Authors calculations based on data from Eurostat online database for Population and Social 
Conditions / Labour Market / Labour costs available at: 
http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/portal/page?_pageid=1090,30070682,1090_30298591&_dad=portal&_
schema=PORTAL 
Notes: Wages and salaries in manufacturing, 2003Q1-2008Q2. Index 2000=100. Wages and salaries in 
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Source: Authors calculations based on data from Eurostat online database for Population and Social 
Conditions / Labour Market / Employment and unemployment (Labour Force Survey) available at: 
http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/portal/page?_pageid=1090,30070682,1090_30298591&_dad=portal&_
schema=PORTAL 
Notes: In percent, 2004 and 2007. Annual data, not seasonally adjusted. Unemployment rates represent 
unemployed persons as a percentage of the labour force.  
 
 























Source: Authors calculations based on data from Eurostat online database for Population and Social 
Conditions / Labour Market / Employment and unemployment (Labour Force Survey) available at: 
http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/portal/page?_pageid=1090,30070682,1090_30298591&_dad=portal&_
schema=PORTAL 
Notes: In percent, 2004 and 2007. The indicator employment growth gives the change in percentage 
from one year to another of the total number of employed persons on the economic territory of the 
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Source: Authors’ calculations based on data from Eurostat online database for Population and Social 
Conditions / Labour Market / Job vacancy statistics   available at: 
http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/portal/page?_pageid=1090,30070682,1090_30298591&_dad=portal&_
schema=PORTAL 
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Source: Authors’ calculations based on data from Eurostat online database for Population and Social 
Conditions / Labour Market / Labour costs  available at: 
http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/portal/page?_pageid=1090,30070682,1090_30298591&_dad=portal&_
schema=PORTAL 
Notes: Wages and salaries, 2004 and 2007. Index 2000=100. 
 
 


























Source: World Bank World Development Indicators CD-ROM 2007. 
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Source: World Bank World Development Indicators CD-ROM 2007. 
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